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Summary box
 ► Not all countries make their Covid-19 task force 
membership list public—the available information 
varies by country.
 ► There is currently a predominance of politicians, 
virologists and epidemiologists in the Covid-19 re-
sponse at the country level.
 ► Experts on non- Covid-19 health, social and societal 
consequences of Covid-19 response measures are, 
for the most part, not included in Covid-19 decision- 
making bodies.
 ► There is little transparency regarding whom 
decision- making bodies are consulting as their 
source of advice and information.
 ► From the available data on Covid-19 decision- 
making entities, female representation is particularly 
paltry.
 ► In addition, civil society is hardly involved in national 
government decision- making nor its response ef-
forts, barring some exceptions.
 ► We need to be more inclusive and multidisciplinary: 
the Covid-19 crisis is not simply a health problem 
but a societal one—it impacts every single person in 
society one way or another.
 ► Decision makers need to address more systemati-
cally the suffering from mental illness exacerbations, 
domestic violence, child abuse, child development 
delays, chronic diseases and so on, during lockdown.
InTroduCTIon
As SARS- COV-2 (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2) ravages the globe, 
heads of state are making swift decisions to 
put large swathes of the world’s population 
under mass isolation in the race to heed off 
Covid-19’s lethality, particularly in certain 
population subgroups. How are these deci-
sions—that affect each and every one of us, 
some groups disproportionately and regard-
less of Covid-19 status—made? How far have 
policy makers and politicians consulted those 
who have experience and expertise on the 
secondary effects of lockdowns, social isola-
tion measures and movement restrictions?
We attempted to address these questions 
with a rapid analysis of 24 countries’ Covid-19 
task force compositions. The countries were 
selected to represent a range of geogra-
phies and income levels. As far as possible, 
we focused on governance bodies set up or 
activated to give scientific, or evidence- based, 
advice to national decision makers. In some 
countries, the advisory and decision- making 
bodies were one and the same, often taking 
the form of government- only interministerial 
committees. We excluded committees which 
were established to focus on a specific area, 
for example, research related to vaccina-
tion; rather, we examined committees whose 
explicit mandate (based on available informa-
tion) was to provide advisory guidance on the 
overall national response.
We scanned publicly available documen-
tation from government websites, media 
articles, and in specific cases, contacted our 
networks in governments and health minis-
tries for official documentation. We then 
researched the task force members’ back-
grounds and triangulated from different 
sources to classify them based on their current 
professional role or area of specialisation. 
Experts were thus categorised based on the 
principal reason for their appointment to the 
task force. For example, a physician with a 
current public health role would be classified 
as a public health specialist and not a clini-
cian, the assumption being that their current 
role is most relevant for the task force. The 
‘government’ or ‘Ministry of Health’ category 
was allocated to career civil servants, that is, 
posts which are usually filled by generalists 
rather than specialists. Most other task force 
members, including public health institute 
staff, were categorised according to their 
expertise since the rationale for their task 
force membership is their specific skill set 
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(mathematical modeller, virologist, etc) rather than their 
institutional affiliation.
At least two coauthors independently categorised the 
task force members and crosschecked categorisations 
with each other.
How InCluSIve and TranSparenT IS CovId-19 deCICIon-
makIng?
We highlight a number of key issues, some very worrying, 
made evident by table 1:
1.‘evidence’ seems to be largely understood to mean 
research-based evidence, and not necessarily experiential, 
implementation-based evidence from the field
The vast majority of Covid-19 response task force members 
are from reputed universities and government institutes 
where rigorous research is conducted in the classical 
sense, often under clinical trial or laboratory conditions. 
Information and evidence on the lived experiences and 
everyday challenges faced by the various groups in society 
who are (at times, severely) affected by isolation meas-
ures seem to be altogether overlooked in the urgency of 
the current situation.
2.among researchers, mainly virologists and epidemiologists 
seem to be consulted, leaving out other health and also non-
health experts
Most countries acknowledge the need for government to 
work jointly with the medical (and public health) commu-
nity in the national Covid-19 response. However, mainly 
virologists and epidemiologists seem to be consulted, 
largely leaving out specialists in areas such as mental 
health, child health, chronic diseases, preventive medi-
cine, gerontology, not to mention experts in non- health 
spheres.
Social isolation measures have enormous secondary 
effects1 beyond the primary aim of curbing viral spread. 
These effects go far beyond health (discussed below). 
But even within the health space, the consequences of 
not accessing, or inadequately accessing,2 basic essential 
services for a wide range of non- Covid-19- related condi-
tions3 do not seem to have been sufficiently considered.
3.when the task force is government-only, more non-health 
sectors seem to be represented, but at the detriment of non-
government expertise
Still, some countries’ Covid-19 task forces are government- 
only. In those cases, there at least seems to be a stronger 
presence of non- health sectors, although to the detri-
ment of non- government expertise.
In a number of countries, Covid-19 task forces consist 
of high- level government cadres only, combining the 
advisory and decision- making elements into one. Medical 
and epidemiological expertise seems to come from 
government health institutions, but it is not always clear 
who is being consulted beyond government.
A multiministry task force at least theoretically brings 
in concerns from other sectors such as education,4 
economy, interior, and so on, potentially raising serious 
issues in terms of, for example, child development5 
(relevant to decisions on school closures, for example),6 
loss of livelihoods7 (particularly relevant in low- income 
countries8 and those with large social inequalities and 
no social safety net), and further marginalisation of 
migrants9 and illegal workers (who often have nowhere 
to isolate to). However, how far those concerns are 
actually taken into consideration is impossible to 
discern without more transparency with regard to the 
content of deliberations and potential consultations 
with external parties.
4.Civil society and community groups do not seem to be 
consulted at all
In addition to civil society and community groups not 
being engaged in primary discussions, neither are 
social workers, child development specialists, human 
rights lawyers, and many other people whose experien-
tial and vocational expertise are particularly relevant in 
terms of societal rights, and groups affected by isolation 
measures. The WHO weekly Covid-19 situation update 
from 15 April mentions that only 36% of member states 
reported having a Covid-19 community engagement 
plan.10 In addition, a majority of the 175 civil society 
respondents from 56 countries confirmed in a recent 
rapid survey of the UHC2030 Alliance’s Civil Society 
Engagement Mechanism that most of their Covid-19 
response work was, indeed, independent of the govern-
ment. Results and methodology of the survey can be 
found here.
Vulnerable groups11 such as the disabled,12 those with 
serious mental health conditions,13 single mothers,14 
people in abusive family relationships15 and the elderly16 
bear the burden of the negative consequences of isola-
tion and loneliness, potentially threatening the social 
fabric of society. Civil society organisations, community 
groups, social workers, nurse- caregivers and many other 
groups are at the front lines with this broad cross- section 
of society clearly affected by the far- reaching effects of 
mass isolation. Civil society can also raise awareness on 
existing social inequalities which are usually exacerbated 
in crisis situations, leaving many to feel that ‘self- isolation 
is a privilege for the rich’.17–20 If there is one thing that 
we should learn from another virus- based crisis (HIV), it 
is that the population, communities and civil society are 
an integral part of the crisis solution.21
5.women are a minority in Covid-19 task forces, and are not 
represented at all in some
The Women in Global Health movement has already 
lamented the abysmally low proportion of women repre-
sented in global Covid-19 response efforts.22 Besides 
some notable exceptions, the same low percentages of 
female experts are seen across the national task forces 
we rapidly reviewed, with some task forces even being all 
male. Women’s perspectives and expertise clearly seem 
to be heard less often than male colleagues, even while 
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Table 1 Covid-19 task forces set up to advise national governments
Country
Name of task force convened or activated for Covid-19 
response
Composition of task force by member 
expertise Gender distribution
Argentina28 Expert Committee (El comité de expertos)  ► 5 Government officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 6 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Public health specialist
12 M; 3 F
Belgium29 30 Scientific Committee Coronavirus (Comité scientifique 
Coronavirus)
 ► 3 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Laboratory specialist
2 M; 3 F
Burkina Faso31 Name unknown  ► 1 Ministry of Health official
 ► 4 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 2 Epidemiologists
 ► 3 Public health specialists
 ► 2 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Communication specialist
 ► 1 Private sector
 ► 4 Unknown
14 M; 5 F
Chad32 Scientific Committee for Covid-19
(Comité Scientifique Covid-19)
 ► 1 Ministry of Health official
 ► 7 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Laboratory specialist
 ► 8 Public health specialists
 ► 2 Intensive Care specialists
 ► 12 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Pharmacist
 ► 1 Nutrition specialist
 ► 1 Lawyer
 ► 1 Socioanthropologist
 ► 1 Historian
33 M; 4 F
Chile33 Advisory Board of Ministry of Health for Covid-19
(Consejo Asesor del MINSAL por Covid-19)
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 1 Infectious disease specialist
 ► 3 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
3 M; 4 F
China34 35 Central Leading Group on Responding to the Novel Coronavirus 
Disease Outbreak
 ► 9 Government officials 8 M; 1 F
France36–39 Scientific council Covid-19
(Conseil scientifique Covid-19)
 ► 4 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Mathematical modelling specialist
 ► 1 Intensive Care specialist
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
 ► 1 Anthropologist
 ► 1 Sociologist
8 M; 2 F
Analysis, research and expertise committee
(Comité analyse, recherche et expertise (CARE))
 ► 6 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Mathematical modelling specialist
 ► 2 Laboratory specialists
 ► 2 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Anthropologist
7 M; 5 F
Germany40–42 Interministerial crisis unit
(Krisenstab)
 ► Government officials from six different 
ministries
Unknown
Guinea43 44 Scientific council on pandemic response to coronavirus disease 
(Covid-19)
(Conseil scientifique de riposte contre la pandémie de la maladie à 
coronavirus (Covid-19))
 ► 2 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Laboratory specialist
 ► 3 Public health specialists
 ► 3 Pharmacists
 ► 3 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Psychologist
 ► 1 Economist
 ► 2 Socioanthropologist
14 M; 3 F
Haiti45 Scientific committee to combat coronavirus
(Cellule scientifique pour lutter contre le coronavirus)
 ► 1 Ministry of Health official
 ► 2 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 1 Laboratory specialist
 ► 2 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Intensive Care specialist
 ► 3 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Mental health specialist
 ► 1 Sociologist
 ► 1 Civil society
12 M; 2 F
Hungary46 Coronaviral Defence Operational Staff
(Koronavírus- járvány Elleni Védekezésért Felelős Operatív Törzs)
 ► 11 Government officials
 ► 3 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 1 Infectious disease specialist
14 M; 1 F
Continued
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Country
Name of task force convened or activated for Covid-19 
response
Composition of task force by member 
expertise Gender distribution
Italy47–49 Operational Committee on Coronavirus for Civil Protection
(Comitato operativo sul Coronavirus alla Protezione Civile)
 ► 6 Government officials
 ► 1 Ministry of Health official
7 M; 0 F
Scientific Technical Committee
(Comitato Tecnico Scientifico)
 ► 4 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 2 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Public health specialist
7 M; 0 F
Task force tech anti Covid-19  ► 2 Government officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 2 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 5 Epidemiologists
 ► 1 Mathematician
 ► 4 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Social scientist
 ► 12 Data management specialists
 ► 4 Statisticians
 ► 1 Physicist
 ► 1 Civil engineering expert
 ► 1 Digital health expert
 ► 1 Chemist
 ► 1 Information systems expert
 ► 13 Economists
 ► 3 Computer science experts
 ► 1 Communication technology expert
 ► 3 Digital transformation experts
 ► 2 Emergency management experts
 ► 11 Lawyers
 ► 1 Unknown
56 M; 18 F
Kenya50 51 National Emergency Response Committee  ► 17 Government officials
 ► 4 Ministry of Health officials
15 M; 6 F
Mali52 53 Crisis Committee
(Le Comité de crise)
 ► 2 Governmental officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
 ► 1 Infectious disease specialist
 ► 2 Laboratory specialists
 ► 4 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
12 M; 0 F
Scientific and Technical Committee of the National Public Health 
Institute
(Comité Scientifique et Technique de l’Institut National de Santé 
Publique -INSP)
 ► 5 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Public health specialist
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
 ► 1 Agronomist
 ► 1 Ecologist
 ► 1 Nutritionist
9 M; 1 F
Philippines54 Inter- Agency task force  ► 2 Government officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
4 M; 0 F
National task force Covid-1919 (National Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management Council - NDRRMC)
 ► 4 Government officials 4 M; 0 F
Portugal55 56 Task force Covid-19  ► 13 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 10 Epidemiologists
 ► 12 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Intensive Care specialist
 ► 5 Other medical specialists
 ► 1 Chemist
 ► 2 Communication specialists
 ► 25 Unknown
26 M; 42 F
National Public Health Council
(Conselho Nacional de Saúde Pública)
 ► 2 Government officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health Officials
 ► 5 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologist
 ► 2 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
 ► 1 Pharmacist
 ► 2 Lawyers
 ► 1 Private sector
 ► 2 CSO
14 M; 6 F
Singapore57 Multi- Ministry Taskforce on Wuhan Coronavirus  ► 10 Government officials
 ► 1 Ministry of Health official
10 M; 1 F
Table 1 Continued
Continued
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Country
Name of task force convened or activated for Covid-19 
response
Composition of task force by member 
expertise Gender distribution
South Korea58 59 Central Disease Control Headquarters (KCDC)  ► Led by Jung Eun- Kyeong (Director)
 ► Other members unknown
1 F, unknown
Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters  ► Led by the Prime Minister (Chung 
Sye- kyun)
 ► Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Central Incidence Management System for Novel Coronavirus 
Infection
 ► Led by Minister of Health and Welfare 
(Park Neung- hoo)
 ► Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Central Disaster Management Headquarters  ► Led by Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(Park Neung- hoo)
 ► Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Government- wide Support Centre  ► Led by Minister of Public 
Administration and Security
 ► Other members unknown
1 M, unknown
Local Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (local 
municipal governments nationwide)
 ► Led by the head of the local 
government
 ► Other members unknown
Unknown
Local quarantine task force (local municipal governments 
nationwide)
 ► Led by the head of the local 
government
 ► Other members unknown
Unknown
Spain60 Scientific Technical Committee Covid-19
(Comité Cientifico Técnico Covid-19 19)
 ► 3 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 3 Epidemiologists
3 M; 3 F
Switzerland61 Science Task Force  ► 6 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 2 Epidemiologists
 ► 1 Mathematical modelling specialist
 ► 1 Laboratory specialist
 ► 2 Public health specialists
 ► 1 Environmental engineering expert
 ► 1 Computer science expert
 ► 1 Economist
 ► 1 Bioethics expert
12 M; 4 F
Thailand62 National committee for controlling the spread of Covid-19  ► 26 Government officials
 ► 2 Ministry of Health officials
28 M; 0 F
Vietnam63 Committee for Covid-19 Prevention and Control
(Tiểu ban giám sát phòng, chống dịch bệnh Covid-19).
 ► 5 Government officials
 ► 9 Ministry of Health officials
13 M; 1 F
United Kingdom64–66 New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group 
(NERVTAG)
 ► 9 Infectious diseases specialists
 ► 1 Epidemiologists
 ► 2 Mathematical modelling specialists
 ► 1 Public health specialist
 ► 1 Intensive Care specialist
 ► 1 Sociologist
 ► 1 Psychologist
14 M; 2 F
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP)  ► 1 Government official
 ► 12 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Mathematical modelling specialist
 ► 1 Public health specialist
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
13 M; 3 F
Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI)  ► 19 Infectious disease specialists
 ► 1 Other medical specialist
 ► 1 Lay member (unknown)
12 M; 9 F
USA67 68 White House Coronavirus Task Force  ► 19 Government officials
 ► 1 Ministry of Health official
 ► 3 Infectious disease specialists
21 M; 2 F
Table 1 Continued
the majority of front- line health staff fighting the crisis is 
female.23
6.more transparency is needed on who is taking decisions 
and how
We took great pains to scan a broad variety of websites, news-
papers and government documents in several languages 
within a short amount of time. Still, information on (1) 
Who is making far- reaching decisions on an unprecedented 
global and national crisis? (2) How decision makers are 
reaching their conclusions (ie, who else are they reaching 
out to for advice)? (3) Which exact positions advisers had? 
was not always easy to come by. There are signs that some 
countries’ governments and/or Covid-19 task forces are 
indeed consulting with outside parties24 relevant to the 
secondary consequences of long- term isolation25 but this 
information is generally not clear and transparent.
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In addition, transparency on selection criteria for the 
task forces themselves is needed to better understand the 
weight given to the different aspects of the outbreak.
ConCluSIon
We acknowledge that the information may not be 
complete, nor completely up to date, given the extremely 
fast- paced dynamic of the Covid-19 outbreak as well as 
response measures. We also recognise that Covid-19 task 
force compositions are not the sole indication of whose 
voices are included in decision- making. Through the 
fairly broad range of (mostly) publicly available informa-
tion analysed, we attempted to understand which groups 
the task forces were reaching out to within the scope of 
a rapid analysis. In general, protocols, reports, minutes 
of task force meetings and lists of externally consulted 
parties were simply not easily available. Nevertheless, 
we feel that the broad conclusions we take based on 
our rapid (but imperfect) analysis still hold based on 
the information we were able to access. The table above 
displays the list of countries and their available task force 
information.
Governments must recognise the multidimensional 
effects and needs of society26 during this Covid-19 crisis 
and consult more broadly and across disciplines, within 
health and beyond health, based on a true multisec-
toral paradigm. More importantly, more transparency 
is needed regarding who decision- making bodies are 
listening to as a basis for their decisions. Now more than 
ever, the voices of those who are at risk of getting left 
behind need to be heard.27 In the end, we must ensure 
that we do not do more harm than good with the measures 
in place to protect our at- risk populations.
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